Overlaps and/or Duplication of Powers between the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine

The issue of cleaning up the judiciary and more effective personnel policy in this area has been one of the most important aspects of judicial reform for more than a decade. And the key in this case is the activity of the judicial governance bodies – the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). Both of these bodies are vested with powers in personnel matters.

Despite the seemingly clear and detailed formulation of the tasks and functions of the HCJ and the HCJ in personnel management of the judicial system, there are still a number of duplications and contradictions in their powers.

In this case, it should be borne in mind that the existence of two separate bodies in this area is not just an institutional legacy (the HCJ has existed in various formats since 1994, and the HCJ as the High Council of Justice in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine since 1996). This was also due to the desire to create a certain system of checks and balances in this area and to prevent the establishment of political or other control over a single body if it exists.

Nevertheless, the existing intersections raise the question of optimizing the powers of these bodies and their status. In particular, in the Roadmap for Transformation in the Rule of Law, necessary for the European integration process and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on May 14, 2025, among the necessary measures in the section "Justice" is indicated "Development and adoption of a law aimed at improving the status of judicial governance and self-government bodies, delimitation of their competence and, if necessary, reorganization", which indicates the importance of solving this problem at the international level.

Although the relevant legislative changes are planned to be adopted based on the results of the audit, which is also among the necessary measures, the main duplication of powers of these bodies in the personnel sphere of justice is already obvious.

Yes, both bodies are involved in the process of appointment, transfer and selection of judges, which creates unnecessary bureaucracy and a platform for potential abuses. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Council of Ukraine conducts qualification assessments of judges, but the final decision on the transfer or dismissal of a judge is made by the Supreme Judicial Council.

Moreover, the independence of the Council of Judges of Ukraine is also in question: the body, which is formally considered autonomous, is dependent on the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council in many critical moments. Also, the lack of a clear demarcation of responsibility for failure to meet deadlines, delays in processes and errors leads to a blurring of responsibility.

1. Appointment and Selection of Judges

According to paragraph 2 of part 1 of Article 93 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, the HQCJ conducts the selection of candidates for judicial positions, including organizing special background checks in accordance with the law and administering the qualification examination.

In addition, under paragraph 3 of part 1 of Article 93 of the same Law, the HQCJ submits a recommendation to the HCJ regarding the appointment of a candidate to the position of judge.

For its part, pursuant to paragraph 1 of part 1 of Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine “On the High Council of Justice”, the HCJ submits a motion on the appointment of a judge to office.

Thus, the HQCJ carries out the preliminary stage – the selection of judges (receiving and verifying application documents, administering the qualification examination consisting of the written test and interview, organizing special background checks, assessing personal moral and psychological qualities of candidates when necessary, compiling a ranking of candidates, and providing recommendations). The HCJ, in turn, makes the final decision to submit a motion to the President of Ukraine for the appointment of the candidate to the judicial position.

2. Transfer of Judges

According to paragraph 4 of part 1 of Article 93 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, the HQCJ submits to the HCJ a recommendation on the transfer of a judge in accordance with this Law, except for transfers imposed as a disciplinary sanction.

Pursuant to paragraph 10 of part 1 of Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine “On the High Council of Justice”, the HCJ adopts decisions on the transfer of a judge from one court to another, as well as decisions on the secondment of a judge to another court of the same level and specialization.

Thus, the HQCJ effectively prepares a recommendation, while the HCJ makes the final decision on the transfer of a judge, which demonstrates the interdependent nature of this procedure.

3. Qualification Assessment of Judges

Both the HCJ and the HQCJ influence the assessment of candidates for judicial positions and sitting judges, albeit from different perspectives.

According to paragraph 7 of part 1 of Article 93 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, the HQCJ conducts the qualification assessment.

Furthermore, under paragraph 6 of part 1 of Article 93 of the same Law, the HQCJ approves the form and content of the application for participation in the selection of candidates for judicial positions, the candidate’s questionnaire, the procedure for taking the qualification examination and the methodology for evaluating candidates, the regulations on the competition for filling a vacant judicial position, the procedure and methodology for qualification assessment, the procedure for forming and maintaining a judge’s dossier (or candidate’s dossier), as well as the program and procedure for initial judicial training.

For its part, pursuant to paragraph 204 of part 1 of Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine “On the High Council of Justice”, the HCJ approves the Unified Indicators for assessing the integrity and professional ethics of judges (or candidates for judicial positions) after consultations with the HQCJ, the Council of Judges of Ukraine, and the Public Integrity Council.

In other words, the HQCJ carries out the assessment process itself and determines its procedural and methodological framework, while the HCJ establishes the criteria of integrity and professional ethics for judges and candidates, which the HQCJ applies in its work.

Although at first glance the functions of these bodies appear clearly delineated and designed to coordinate their activities, the format in which one body sets the framework and provides recommendations while the other makes the final decision carries a risk of interdependence. Moreover, the model of “double control” and “re-interviewing” of judicial candidates can be viewed both as an additional safeguard and as a potential ground for abuse and delay in the judicial selection process.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Eliminating overlaps and duplication of powers between the HCJ and the HQCJ is possible through amendments to the legislation — namely, the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” and the Law “On the High Council of Justice” — which should establish an exhaustive list of functions for each body.

Such amendments could, for example, provide that the HQCJ be empowered to carry out the full cycle of judicial personnel selection (from organizing examinations to compiling the final list of candidates), followed by automatic approval by the HCJ without additional consideration by the Council. At the same time, the HCJ could retain the function of verifying integrity and ethical standards, without suspending the overall process.

A similar approach should be applied to the transfer of judges, entrusting decision-making to a single body — for instance, the HCJ.

In the area of qualification assessment, it is necessary to unify the procedure and stipulate that the methodology and criteria be determined by a single body — evidently the HQCJ — with the possible involvement of the other body on an advisory basis. The body conducting the assessment should bear full responsibility for timelines and outcomes, while the “double” verification of candidates’ compliance with integrity criteria should be eliminated.

This approach would simplify procedures, reduce duplication, and clearly allocate responsibility, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of personnel policy within the judiciary. It is evident that as long as both institutions exist, overlaps and duplications — including less apparent ones — will continue to occur. One possible solution could therefore be the creation of a single body based on the merger of the HCJ and the HQCJ.

However, a comprehensive resolution of this issue will only be possible following an audit of the activities of judicial governance and self-governance bodies, as envisaged by the Roadmap for the Rule of Law.

This publication was prepared by the Dnistrianskyi Center within the framework of the project “Assessment of the Functional Effectiveness of Judicial Governance and Self-Governance Bodies”, implemented under a grant provided by the EU Project Pravo-Justice, implemented by Expertise France. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the Dnistrianskyi Center and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.